There Is No Inconsistency in Reality
There is no inconsistency in the world.
If you mean that there is no inconsistency in reality, that's correct.
Yes, I mean that. Reality really exists, and what really exists can't contain any inconsistency in it. In other words, anything that contains any inconsistency can't really exist.
The phrase, 'really exists', sounds odd: it's as though there is something that doesn't really exist, but exists.
I know that that phrase is redundant, but I used that phrase in order to avoid a misunderstanding.
What misunderstanding is that?
Well, for example, I write a sentence on this sheet of paper. (He really wrote.)
You wrote, "I have a white shirt that is black."
This sheet of paper really exists, and the written word, 'shirt', really exists.
I can touch the sheet of paper and the written word, 'shirt'. In fact, I'm touching the lines of ink, shaped 'shirt'.
But the shirt doesn't really exist.
So, the 'shirt' exists, but the shirt doesn't exist.
That's what I mean when I say that the shirt doesn't really exist.
I see.
And such inconsistent shirt as a white shirt that is black can't exist in reality, but any inconsistent 'shirt' can be depicted on a sheet of paper.
As there might be some more misunderstandings, why don't you clarify things more?
Can there be any other misunderstanding? I can't even imagine such thing as a reality in which inconsistency exists. What kind of reality is that?
What if someone counters that the white shirt can become black by being dyed black?
. . . Is that any rebuttal? The shirt was white at a time, and is black now. There is no inconsistency there. I'm saying that the shirt can't be white and be black at the same time.
What if someone counters that the shirt is white on the front and is black on the back?
So what? The shirt isn't a white shirt at all, but a shirt that is white on the front and is black on the back. If someone calls it a white shirt, the statement is just inaccurate; that isn't a matter about consistency of reality.
What if someone counters that a person calls the shirt white and another person calls the shirt black?
What if? . . . Well, I would recommend one of them to go to see an ophthalmologist, and the refuter to go to see a psychotherapist. . . . That isn't any inconsistency in the reality of the shirt: just, something is wrong with the optic nerve of someone, or someone has a peculiar usage of words. However diseased someone is or however idiosyncratic someone's vocabulary is, the objective characteristics of the shirt isn't affected.
What if someone counters that if the shirt is seen through red cellophane, it will look reddish?
Is that an inconsistency? . . . Being white doesn't mean looking white, to be exact; being white means reflecting light equally for all the wavelengths of the visible region. So, the white shirt is white whether it looks reddish or not by being seen through red cellophane, being illustrated by red light, or whatever reason.
What if someone counters that in a parallel universe, the shirt may be black?
So what? . . . That practice of imprudently broaching parallel universes is quite ugly. It's like an unreasonable child who won't listen to what his or her parents say.
What do you mean?
There is such a child who retorts to a prohibition by his or her parents, saying, "It's allowed in Tom's home!"
I guess, Tom is his or her friend.
Yes. The parents will say, "It doesn't matter what are allowed in other homes. It isn't allowed in this home."
That is reasonable.
I will say, "It doesn't matter what colors the shirt is in other parallel universes. It's white in this universe, and that's all that matters here."
That is reasonable.
I'm talking about this universe. The shirt's being black in another universe isn't any rebuttal to the shirt's being white in this universe. There is no inconsistency there.
That's true.
If an inconsistency seems to exist in reality to us, that's because our understanding of the world is shallow and inaccurate.
The inconsistency exists in our understanding, not in reality.
If some inconsistency seems to exist in the case of red cellophane, that's because we don't understand very well what colors are and the mechanism of how we perceive colors. In fact, we deepen our understandings only by contriving a consistent explanation for what seems inconsistent.
When something seems inconsistent, it's a clear sign that our understanding doesn't fit reality well.
It's a chance to revise our faulty understanding. But the revision can happen only if we say, "Inconsistencies aren't OK; we have to remedy them."
We can safely conclude that anyone with whom inconsistencies are all right doesn't have the will to be truthful.
As reality is consistent, an understanding that accurately reflects reality can't help but be consistent. That is, being consistent is a necessary condition of being a truth, and trying to be consistent is a necessary condition of trying to be truthful.
