Not to wobble is treasured among some Earthians.
What do you mean by 'not to wobble'?
In fact, what I mean isn't the issue; what they mean is.
Then, what do they mean?
They seem to mean, 'not to change one's opinions'.
Well, when one improves his or her opinions, the opinions have to change. Is 'not to improve one's opinions' treasured among some Earthians?
Actually, it is. In fact, it isn't a particularly rare sentiment among Earthians.
Why can such a thing happen?
For them, not to wobble means that final conclusions have been already reached, which is a good thing . . . if those conclusions are perfectly correct.
Being said "if those conclusions are perfectly correct," it's impossible because anyone has to build a hypotheses system based on limited information and keep improving the hypotheses system based on newly acquired information, in order to near truths.
The problem is, some people won't admit what's impossible as impossible.
I say, only after we admitted what's impossible as impossible, we can begin to contrive practical methods to near goals.
Anyway, it's somewhat understandable for them to detest acts of changing opinions because there are some people who just say whatever convenient for immediate gains: when being asked about a situation, they express some opinions; when being asked about another situation, they express opinions that are inconsistent with the previous opinions.
That is different from acts of changing opinions: they didn't change the opinions about the first situation, did they?
Well, if they are asked about the first situation again, they will repeat the first set of opinions.
They don't change their opinions, but pick up an adhoc set of opinions for each case.
Ah, that will be a more adequate description.
We should recognize things accurately. If we recognize the act of not wobbling as an act of not changing opinions, we will begin to stick to false opinions.
We have to change opinions in order to improve our opinions. To be consistent is to maintain a single consistent opinions system that is consistent with the reality, not 'not to change opinions'.
Acts of wobbling certainly beget inconsistencies, but acts of not wobbling as acts of not changing opinions can't help but also beget inconsistencies, because our opinions system can't help but become inconsistent with newly acquired information.
We have so far talked about acts of wobbling without any consistent opinions system.
Yes. That's the only acts of wobbling we have recognized so far.
Can't there be a case of wobbling between two consistent opinions systems?
Well, as opinions systems are hypotheses systems, certainly, there can be multiple possible consistent opinions systems at the same time. So, there may be some cases in which we want to move from a opinions system to another opinions system, which isn't necessarily a bad thing.
For example, I decide I should be on a diet.
Obviously, you should.
While it's a habit with me to eat a cup of custard both at breakfast and at supper everyday, . . .
You eat too much.
. . . I decide that I should make it once a day.
Why don't you just quit it altogether?
That isn't an option. Anyway, should I eat it at breakfast, or at supper? That's the question.
That doesn't matter. Just decide, and begin the diet.
I wake up the next day and think, "I should eat it at breakfast because the calories will be used up during the day."
That sounds reasonable.
So, I ate it at the breakfast.
OK.
Then at the supper, I think, "I should rather eat it at supper because it heals my fatigue from the day."
Well, I understand that you become to want to eat something sweet when you feel some fatigue although I don't know whether it really heals your fatigue. Right now, I don't particularly deny your hypothesis.
So, I decide to eat it at supper, and ate it.
Well, such a change will be permissible. You didn't realize in the morning how it is good for your fatigue. We can't just reach an optimal conclusion in one leap. We have to admit that. We shouldn't stick to a suboptimal conclusion if you realized that it isn't optimal.
At the breakfast next morning, I think, "Reconsidering the effectiveness as a diet, I should definitely eat it at breakfast." And . . . I ate it.
. . .
At the supper, I think, "However, I'm on the diet for my health, right? If the diet doesn't heal this fatigue, how is it good for my health?" So, I ate it.
. . .
At the breakfast next morning, . . .
You ate it, didn't you?
Yes, . . . in short, and at the supper, . . .
I know you ate it.
You know, that's an act of wobbling between two consistent opinions systems.
I don't know.
I swear that I never meant to eat it at the supper when I ate it at the second breakfast. I sincerely selected the opinions system that I should eat it only at breakfast. I was consistent both at breakfasts and at suppers!
I wonder.
How so?
At the first supper, you already had both points of the effectiveness as a diet and the power to heal symptoms of fatigue, and you decided that the latter outweighs the former after you compared the two. I don't see any reasonableness in your overturning the decision at the second breakfast.
But if I eat it at breakfast, it will be definitely more effective as a diet . . .
You already knew that at the first supper and made the decision based on that knowledge.
I changed my mind at the breakfast . . .
On what ground?
Being asked 'on what ground' . . .
But you changed your mind based on a piece of reasoning, didn't you?
Well . . .
You can certainly change your opinions system, but you have to do so based on a piece of consistent reasoning.
So, unless we find any piece of consistent reasoning to change our opinions system, we should stick to the current opinions system?
I think so. Otherwise, we will become Buridan's ass.
Ah, the ass that will die of hunger because it can't select a road from two roads . . .
Usually, we change our opinions system in order to deal with newly acquired information. In that way, we can't just wobble between two fixed opinions systems.
There will be also cases in which we find an inconsistency in our opinions system without any piece of newly acquired information.
There will be, but we won't be able to return to the previous opinions system because it contains the inconsistency.
Surely we won't be.
But I see your point. Certainly, there are cases of wobbling between possible consistent opinions systems. They are caused by moving from a opinions system to another opinions system without based on any piece of consistent reasoning.
At a supper, the fatigue may be greater than it was at the last supper. That is newly acquired information, and I say, "I will eat it at supper because my fatigue can be this great."
I don't think that that's newly acquired information: you aren't damn as you didn't know that your fatigue varies day to day and your fatigue can be that great, are you?
Well, . . . I guess so.
That's just a rationalization. Any rationalization happens by an act of pretending not to know what we really know.
I see.
Besides, when you changed your mind at the second breakfast, why didn't you skip the cup the day and begin to eat it at the next breakfast?
Well, it would have been a grave violation of the one-cup-a-day norm.
You don't need such a norm. I thought it wasn't a norm, but a permission.
It is a norm.
But you have been violating the one-cup-a-day regulation for days, eating two cups a day. Isn't that a grave violation, sir?
Well . . .
It seems inconsistent that you can't violate the norm a single day while you are fine with the act of violating the regulation for days, sir.
Well . . .
Besides, if you have to observe the norm, why didn't you skip the cup at the first supper and begin to eat it at the second supper. That way, you wouldn't have broken the norm.
I don't understand the meaning . . .
You understand it, sir. You would have eaten it at the first breakfast, at the second supper, at the third supper, and so on. You wouldn't have broken the norm a single day.
I understand that there is an inconsistency there. After all, acts of wobbling happen because there are some inconsistencies somewhere.