I understand that we have to accept inputs impartially, to develop our hypotheses system appropriately.
We should be aware that inputs don't usually come by themselves. Even if some inputs come by themselves, those inputs are usually one-sided, depending on your position.
Ah-ha, as the place where we stand influences what come to us as inputs, it's a fallacy if we assume that we are impartial because we impartially accept inputs that come to us.
For example, if we live in an equatorial area, we may conclude that it's quite hot on the Bias planet, while if we live in an arctic area, we may conclude that it's freezing on the Bias planet. If we live among kind neighbors, we may conclude that Earthians are kind, while If we live among mean neighbors, we may conclude that Earthians are mean.
Yes. It's a temptation to lay special emphasis on one's experiences in making judgments, but one's experiences are usually one-sided, and such judgments tend to be inaccurate.
Ah, frequently seen are sports instructors who believe, "As I succeeded this way, everybody has to do this way." However, players have different physical and mental constitutions, and one way doesn't fit all.
We have to actively seek impartial inputs for our inputs to be really impartial.
Anyway, impartiality of inputs is crucial.
Of course. If we are allowed to take in only inputs that are convenient for a purpose, we can insist on any arbitrary hypotheses system. That is, consistency is an absolute necessity for any hypotheses system, but if you try to be consistent by ignoring contradictory inputs, any arbitrary hypotheses system can be consistent.
Isn't that so? However, in reality, we tend to do like this:
We hypothesize that results of rolls of a die are always three, and experiment like this. The first roll . . . three! I was right. The next roll . . . two? . . . Well, my way to roll the die was wrong. So, that doesn't count. The next roll . . . five? . . . I didn't sleep well last night. . . . That doesn't count either. The next roll . . . one? That doesn't count anyway. The next roll . . . three! I knew! I was absolutely right!
. . . Yes. That sounds ridiculous, but, actually, that's exactly what we tend to do.
I frequently see such ridiculous claims among Earthians. Many of so-called experts aren't exceptions.
For example, in Japan, a prototype fast breeder nuclear reactor, called Monju, has been determined to be decommissioned after serious accidents and mismanagements, having been able to generate electricity only for 250 days in 22 years, already costing 9 billion dollars and will-be-costing more at least 3 billion dollars to decommission, with its operator judged not qualified to operate it safely and any qualified alternative operator not found. . . . However, an expert, a professor, promoted to build a next level fast nuclear reactor on a news paper. What does he propose to solve the problems found in the experiment of the fast breeder nuclear reactor? Nothing. . . . He just ignores the problems. He doesn't propose any practical solution to them. He just insists that if it succeeds, Japan will get benefits form it, therefore, Japan must build the next level fast nuclear reactor.
A typical thinking process of picking up only inputs that are convenient, ignoring inputs that are inconvenient. He can't judge impartially because he has his personal interests in the matter: if developments of fast nuclear reactors are discarded, his, probably, life long study about fast nuclear reactors will be a trash. In such a case, only noble person will be able to judge impartially.
Ah, I don't doubt that experts know more than laypersons do, but there is no ground to assume that experts are nobler by nature than laypersons are. As experts of fast nuclear reactors are people who will be troubled if developments of fast nuclear reactors are discarded, we can't expect a group of such people to make fair judgments, however knowledgeable they are.
As experts are well-informed, it's usually worthwhile to consider what experts say. But whether they can judge impartially is another story.
Knowledge or intelligence doesn't guarantee impartiality, and without impartiality, we can't attain accurate understandings.
Right.
I have read a Earthian book in which the author claimed that his conclusion had been derived from his impartial considerations, but I couldn't understand a bit what was impartial about it . . .
Ah, to be really impartial is very difficult. He may have felt he was impartial, but feeling being impartial or claiming to be impartial doesn't make one impartial.
As our natural inclination is to want to prove that we are right, we need concrete measures to fight against that inclination and go nearer to impartiality.
Yes. Just intending to be impartial isn't enough for us to be really impartial.
We tend to try to prove our hypotheses system, but I think, that's the beginning of the trouble. In that mentality, we naturally seek inputs that confirm our hypotheses system. That leads to unbalanced inputs.
Yes, that will be the natural course of events.
We have to actively seek inputs that contradict our hypotheses system.
If we aim to develop our understandings, that's the logical conclusion because it's inputs that contradict our hypotheses system that prompt us to evolve our hypotheses system.